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“A bank is a place that will lend you money if you can prove that you don’t
need it.”-Bob Hope1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the modern world of giant financial corporations that are “too big to fail”2
and with the increasing power of the administrative branch of government, the
recent case of American Bankers Ass’n v. National Credit Union Administration3
is emblematic of the battle between these leviathans. 4 On the surface, the D.C.
Circuit supported the expansion of community credit unions over the objections of
traditional banks, bringing added competition to an industry that has seen precious
little of it in recent years. 5
But a more thorough reading shows that the D.C. Circuit also signaled to the
federal administrative agency that approves and supervises credit unions, the
National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”), that it might be nearing the end
of its reach.6 The court found the specter of redlining—a discredited and illegal
bank practice of refusing financial services to minority neighborhoods—was an
all-too-real possibility under the new policies. 7 This Comment explores the
implications of the decision for the future of credit unions and suggests ways that
the NCUA can assure the legality of the policies that narrowly survived judicial
review—this time.8
A credit union is “a cooperative association created to promote thrift among
its members[,] . . . limited to individuals who have a preexisting common bond of
association, occupation, or residence in a well-defined group or geographical
area.”9 Credit unions provide financial services to people who live in
disadvantaged areas and whose income is too high to qualify for government
1. More Quotes by Bob Hope, FORBES.COM, https://www.forbes.com/quotes/author/bob-hope/ (last visited
Nov. 11, 2020).
2. State National Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 795 F.3d 48, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (describing a category of
financial companies as “too big to fail”).
3. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d 649, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
4. Wendy Cassity, Note, The Case for a Credit Union Community Reinvestment Act, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
331, 354 (2000) (describing how credit unions “can aggressively compete, on an unequal regulatory basis, with
banks for customers and profits”).
5. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 674; Martin Schmalz, One Big Reason There’s So Little Competition Among
U.S. Banks, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 13, 2016), available at https://hbr.org/2016/06/one-big-reason-theres-solittle-competition-among-u-s-banks (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining one reason
for the lack of competition in the banking industry).
6. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 674–75 (supporting many recent rule changes for credit union but also
requiring the agency to provide more explanation of one rule).
7. Id. at 668 (“[W]e see merit in the Association’s redlining argument and thus hold the definitional change
to be arbitrary and capricious.”).
8. Infra Parts III–IV.
9. 1 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION § 1A.02[E] (2d ed. 2011 & Cum. Supp.).
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assistance, yet too low to take advantage of traditional banking.10 While the NCUA
enforces restrictions on credit union membership to meet the statutory common
bond requirement,11 the NCUA also promotes the formation of credit unions. 12 The
Federal Credit Union Act sets general terms for the membership limitation and
explicitly delegates to the NCUA the power to define those terms. 13
In early 2017, the NCUA amended its approval standards to increase the size
and flexibility of the geographic areas that credit unions can choose to serve. 14 A
private association that represents the interests of banks, the American Bankers
Association (“ABA”), filed suit against the NCUA to block those changes. 15 Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, a court can only overturn the NCUA’s expressly
delegated power to define terms if the decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”16 Under that standard, the
D.C. District Court in 2018 vacated some of the NCUA’s changes to the credit
union approval standards. 17 On appeal in 2019, the D.C. Circuit saw the situation
differently and came to very different results. 18
If the NCUA carefully navigates the implications of ABA v. NCUA, credit
unions can continue to be a force for good for the foreseeable future. 19 But, if the
NCUA is not careful, credit unions might begin employing a modern version of
redlining, and the D.C. Circuit’s opinion makes it clear the law will not permit
that.20
After providing background for these complex issues in Part II, 21 Part III of
this Comment analyzes the issue that the D.C. Circuit explicitly required the

10. Robert W. Shields, Note, Community Development Financial Institutions and the Community
Development Institutions Act of 1994: Good Ideas in Need of Some Attention, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 637,
650 (1998) (describing how credit unions can provide financial services to otherwise unserved areas, serve
borrows whose incomes are in a gap between those who receive government support and those who can afford
traditional loans, and promote neighborhood development through community development loans).
11. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION 40 (3d ed. 2011) (explaining the duties of
the NCUA).
12. 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B, ch. 1 § I (describing the goals of the NCUA chartering policy and including
“[t]o encourage the formation of credit unions” and “[t]o make quality credit union service available to all eligible
persons” among those goals).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1759(g)(1) (“The Board shall prescribe, by regulation, a definition for the term ‘welldefined local community, neighborhood, or rural district.’”).
14. Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (explaining several rule changes that would take effect Feb. 6, 2017).
15. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d 649, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1966).
17. ABA v. NCUA, 306 F. Supp. 3d 44, 70 (D. D.C. 2018) (granting in part and denying in part the crossmotions for summary judgment).
18. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 674–75 (reversing the challenged parts of the District Court’s result).
19. Infra Parts III–IV.
20. Infra Section III.B; see ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d 649, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“But a community
credit union can engage in more unconventional redlining practices: gerrymander[ing] to create its own
community of exclusively higher-income members.”) (internal quotation mark omitted).
21. Infra Part II.
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NCUA to address: redlining.22 Once the NCUA addresses redlining, there are other
issues that may lead to future lawsuits, and Part IV of this Comment suggests ways
the NCUA can continue to vigorously promote credit unions within the confines
of the law.23
II. BACKGROUND
This Part provides the foundational ideas to support the analysis, starting with
Section A explaining the similarities and differences between credit unions and
banks.24 Section B describes the relevant portions of the Administrative Procedure
Act, which controls how courts review the NCUA’s actions. 25 Section C details the
new NCUA rules that the ABA challenged in its lawsuit. 26 Section D explains the
way as-applied legal challenges and facial challenges relate to ABA v. NCUA and
how they might relate to future cases. 27 Section E presents the history of redlining,
the most significant problem identified by the D.C. Circuit. 28
A. Credit Unions Compared to Banks
Congress originally formed credit unions in 1934 because banks were not
serving the lower economic rungs of society. 29 The concept was to have people
who already shared some kind of bond—geographic or occupational—band
together to lend and borrow to and from each other.30 Since the members knew
each other, they were more likely to trust and respect each other and actually repay
their loans.31 Accordingly, Congress created rules that approve only credit unions
that serve members with a common occupation or that live in a specified
geographic area. 32 Banks have an advantage because they have no such

22. Infra Part III.
23. Infra Part IV.
24. Infra Section II.A.
25. Infra Section II.B.
26. Infra Section II.C.
27. Infra Section II.D.
28. Infra Section II.E.
29. Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut out of Banking, 62 EMORY L.J. 483, 501, 503 (2013)
(describing how “banks had made their services available mostly to corporations and wealthy individuals,
disregarding lower income individuals” and so “Congress passed the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA) in 1934”).
30. Id. at 502 (“There was a requirement that there be a ‘common bond’ among credit union members,
which was aimed at reducing the cost of credit and the chance of delinquency because members knew each
other.”).
31. Id. at 503 (“Congress intended the common bond among the members of a credit union to create a
cohesive association in which the members are known by the officers and by each other . . . [so that] borrowers
would be more reluctant to default.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1759(b) (2006) (limiting membership to a group that shares a common bond of occupation
or association, multiple such common bonds, or that are within a well-defined local community, neighborhood,
or rural district); MALLOY, supra note 11, at 53 (explaining the status and history of the multiple common-bond
rule for credit unions).
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requirement for a “common bond” and can accept any customers they choose. 33
On the other hand, the law exempts credit unions from almost all the taxes banks
pay.34 Congress treats credit unions as a public good and exempts them from state
and federal income taxes because of the service they provide to members. 35
In the early 1980s, credit unions began to struggle.36 At the time, the majority
of credit unions used a common occupational bond among the members.37 The
overall economic downturn of that decade killed off many businesses, which in
turn deprived occupational-bond credit unions of their membership base. 38 The
very existence of the national credit union system was in crisis. 39
In 1982, the NCUA responded by changing its approval standards to allow
occupational-bond credit unions to be significantly larger than before by
permitting multiple occupational-bond groups to band together, even if the
occupational groups were unrelated.40 Banks at the time objected to the increased
competition from these upstarts, suing the NCUA in an attempt to block this
change in NCUA v. First National Bank & Trust Co.41 The lawsuit lasted many
years, but the Supreme Court eventually agreed with the banks in 1998, rejecting
the NCUA’s expansion of occupational-bond credit unions as contrary to the
limitations in the Federal Credit Union Act.42
In the nearly twenty years between the implementation of the NCUA rule
change and the Court’s decision, the new, larger credit unions prospered.43 As a
result of the Court’s decision, more than twenty million credit union customers
could have seen their credit unions eliminated. 44 But Congress intervened to save

33. See generally MALLOY, supra note 11, at 43 (explaining a great many rules that banks must abide by,
none of which is analogous to the common-bond requirement for credit unions).
34. JAMES M. BICKLEY, SHOULD CREDIT UNIONS BE TAXED? 3–4 (2005) (“Federally chartered credit
unions are exempt from all taxes (including income taxes) imposed by any state, territorial, or local taxing
authority, except for local real or personal property taxes.”).
35. Id. at 3 (“In 1937, Congress amended the act to exempt federal credit unions from both federal and
state income taxes because of their service to members.”).
36. Cassity, supra note 4, at 338–39 (“[I]n the early 1980s . . . many federal credit unions were
liquidating.”).
37. Id. at 338 (“at the time more than eighty percent of credit unions were occupation-based.”).
38. Id. at 338–39 (explaining that the cause of the crisis for federal credit unions was the reliance on
occupational bonds and the loss of businesses due to the severe economic downturn of the early 1980s).
39. Id. (describing the crisis as “threatening the safety and soundness of the federal credit union system”).
40. Id. at 338 (describing how in 1982 the NCUA broadened the rule for occupational-bond credit unions
to allow multiple occupational-bond groups to form a credit union together, even if the groups shared no common
bond with each other).
41. 522 U.S. 479 (1998). See also Cassity, supra note 4, at 340 (“Banks began to view these new credit
unions as a competitive threat.”).
42. NCUA v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 503 (1998) (holding that the NCUA’s multiple
common bond rule was “contrary to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress”); see also MALLOY, supra
note , at § 2.04[A] (2d ed. 2011 & Cum. Supp.) (analyzing First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. and its implications).
43. Cassity, supra note 4, at 339 (“The credit union industry, and multiple-group credit unions in particular,
began to experience sustained and significant growth in membership and assets.”).
44. Id. at 344 (“[A]t least twenty million of them joined as members of select employee groups, and their
membership was placed in jeopardy by the Supreme Court decision.”).
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the larger credit unions, overruling NCUA v. First National Bank & Trust Co. by
statute and legalizing multiple-group common bonds.45
Today, credit unions serve more than 110 million members. 46 But, the larger
credit unions get, the less they look like a group of friends pooling their money to
make large purchases and the more they look like traditional banks.47
B. The Administrative Procedure Act
Courts review the NCUA’s actions under the Administrative Procedure Act.48
New rules the NCUA promulgates go through the usual notice-and-comment
rulemaking.49 When the NCUA interprets the statute that sets the boundaries of its
discretion, courts apply the Chevron framework to review that interpretation.50 The
courts must determine whether the interpretation the NCUA offers is reasonable
and whether it contradicts the intent of Congress.51 If a court determines that the
NCUA has acted contrary to the parameters given by Congress, then the court can
vacate the agency’s action.52
The Administrative Procedure Act also imposes an additional requirement for
standing beyond the Article III requirements under the U.S. Constitution.53
Plaintiffs must demonstrate they are within the “zone of interests” of the statute
the agency is interpreting.54 Courts have repeatedly held that competitors—like the
ABA—have standing to challenge an agency action that relaxes restrictions on
competing financial institutions.55

45. Credit Union Membership Access Act, Pub. L. No. 105-219, 112 Stat. 913 (1998); see Cassity, supra
note 4, at 344–45 (describing the rapid response from Congress to “rescue the multiple-group common bond”).
46. John Reosti, Credit Unions vs. Banks: How We Got Here, AMERICAN BANKER (April 24, 2018),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/credit-unions-vs-banks-how-we-got-here (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review) (“Today, credit unions count more than 110 million people as members and hold deposits
totaling $1.1 trillion.”).
47. Cassity, supra note 4, at 340 (“Credit unions were given the power to offer services almost identical to
those that banks were able to offer.”).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966) (“[T]he reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret
. . . statutory provisions”); ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d 649, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“The APA governs this suit.”).
49. See Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,413 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (“[T]he public should have notice and an opportunity to address such
recommendations, as the Administrative Procedure Act requires.”).
50. NCUA v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 499 (1998) (referring explicitly to “the analysis
set forth in Chevron . . .” when reviewing the NCUA’s interpretation of its organic statute).
51. Id. at 500 (“[W]e then inquire whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.”).
52. Id. at 503 (“[T]he NCUA’s current interpretation of § 109 is contrary to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress and is thus impermissible under the first step of Chevron.”).
53. Id. at 488 (“For a plaintiff to have prudential standing under the APA, the interest sought to be protected
by the complainant [must be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . . .
in question.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., NCUA v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488 (1998) (“[C]ompetitors of financial
institutions have standing to challenge agency action relaxing statutory restrictions on the activities of those
institutions.”); Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 403 (1987) (holding that competitors of new “discount
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C. The Challenged Rules
The NCUA made three rule changes that relaxed restrictions on the geographic
areas credit unions can serve.56 Subsection 1 describes the NCUA’s increase to the
allowable size of a “local community.”57 Subsection 2 explains a rule change that
allows credit unions more flexibility to serve only a portion of a geographic area.58
Subsection 3 addresses the increase to the population maximum for a “rural
district.”59
1. Larger Areas for a “Local Community”
The NCUA uses terminology from the United States Census Bureau and the
Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) to specify what geographic areas
qualify as “local communities.”60 Prior to the changes the banks are challenging,
the NCUA already used a type of area called a Core Based Statistical Area
(“CBSA”).61 A CBSA consists of an urban core and adjacent communities that
have ties to the core. 62
Under one of the NCUA’s new rules, a proposed credit union can go beyond
a single CBSA and serve a larger area, so long as the proposed service area fits
within a different and potentially larger OMB-defined geographic grouping.63
Called a Combined Statistical Area (“CSA”), this OMB definition groups together
underlying CBSAs that have a significant number of people who live in one CBSA
but commute to work in another.64 It might seem that—because CSAs are created

brokerage services” had standing to challenge a ruling from the Comptroller that the offices offering these services
were not “branches” of the banks, and were therefore permissible); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620–21
(1971) (holding that competitors had standing to challenge a change to the rules that allowed banks to offer stock
funds); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 46 (1970) (holding that competitors had standing to challenge
a rule change that allowed banks to offer travel services); Ass’n of Data Processing Servs. Org., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 158 (1970) (holding that competitors had standing to challenge a rule change that allowed banks to
offer data processing services).
56. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d 649, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (mentioning that there were two changes to the
definition of “local community” and one change to the definition of “rural district”).
57. Infra Subsection II.C.1.
58. Infra Subsection II.C.2.
59. Infra Subsection II.C.3.
60. Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,412–14 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (using the definition of “Core Based Statistical Areas” from the United
States Census Bureau and “Combined Statistical Areas” from the Office of Management and Budget).
61. Id. at 88,412–13 (explaining the existing rules regarding Core Based Statistical Areas).
62. Glossary, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHY PROGRAM, https://www.census.gov/programssurveys/geography/about/glossary.html#par_textimage_7 (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review) (describing a Core Based Statistical Area has having an urban core of at least 10,000
population and adjacent counties with a “high degree of social and economic integration” with the core).
63. Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,414 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (“The proposed rule added a third ‘presumptive community’: A Combined
Statistical Area as designated by OMB, subject to the same population limit.”).
64. Glossary, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHY PROGRAM, https://www.census.gov/programs-
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by combining CBSAs—CSAs would be geographically much larger than CBSAs,
but the reality is more complicated.65 The average CSAs that fall under the “local
community” population cap of 2.5 million are similar in size to CBSAs the NCUA
has already approved.66 Under this rule change, credit unions can now choose to
serve an area that goes beyond a single CBSA so long as the area fits in a single
CSA.67
2. The Core-Omission Rule
Another new rule from the NCUA changed how a credit union could define its
membership area to cover only part of a CSA or CBSA.68 Since 2010, the NCUA
required credit unions to include the urban core in any membership area based on
a CBSA.69 But, under the new rule, the NCUA allows a membership area to omit
the core.70 So, not only can credit unions serve a larger geographical area under the
rule change described above, but the area no longer needs to anchor itself to an
urban core.71 The D.C. Circuit found this seemingly simple rule change arbitrary
and capricious.72
3. Increasing the “Rural District” Population Cap
In addition to the rule changes regarding urban service areas, the NCUA also
changed the rules for credit unions that serve rural districts. 73 The Census Bureau
has no definition of a “rural” area aside from anything that is not urban.74
surveys/geography/about/glossary.html#par_textimage_7 (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review) (“Combined Statistical Areas (CSAs) consist of two or more adjacent CBSAs that
have substantial employment interchange.”).
65. See Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,414–15 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (comparing the sizes of CSAs and CBSAs).
66. Id. (finding the average qualifying CSA was 4553 square miles and the average approved CBSA was
4572 square miles).
67. Id. at 88,414 (“The proposed rule added a third ‘presumptive community’: A Combined Statistical
Area as designated by OMB, subject to the same population limit”).
68. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d 649, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“The new rule no longer requires that the core be
included in the local community that a credit union proposes to serve.”).
69. Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,413 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (“Since 2010, the Board has required a community consisting of a portion
of a CBSA to include the CBSA’s core area.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id. (“The proposed rule [repeals] the core area service requirement.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
71. Id. at 88,413–14 (allowing multiple CBSAs to be combined into a larger Combined Statistical Area
and eliminating the rule that required a credit union service area to contain the urban core).
72. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 669 (“[T]he eliminated core requirement is arbitrary and capricious.”).
73. Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (“The amendments will implement changes in policy affecting: The definition of a local
community, a rural district, and an underserved area.”) (emphasis added).
74. Glossary, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHY PROGRAM, https://www.census.gov/programssurveys/geography/about/glossary.html#par_textimage_7 (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (on file with the University

168

University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 52
Therefore, the NCUA cannot borrow a well-defined Census Bureau “rural
district,” but instead must devise its own definition.75
There are two parts to the NCUA’s definition of a rural district. 76 First, the
overall population density must be less than 100 people per square mile, or at least
half of the population must live outside areas the Census Bureau designates as
“urban.”77 Second, the total population in the service area cannot exceed a
specified maximum.78 The NCUA changed that maximum, quadrupling it from
250,000 to 1 million.79
D. As-Applied Challenges Compared to Facial Challenges
When challenging a law, regulation, or rule, there are two types of challenges
that a party can bring.80 The first type is a facial challenge because it alleges the
law, regulation, or rule is illegal “on its face.” 81 The second type is an as-applied
challenge because it alleges that the law, regulation, or rule is illegal as applied in
a particular instance. 82
It is more difficult to succeed with facial challenges because they require the
plaintiff to show that the law, regulation, or rule is fundamentally flawed and
cannot be implemented in a legal way.83 It is easier to succeed with as-applied
challenges because a law, regulation, or rule that is predominantly legal might still
be applied in illegal ways in specific cases. 84
The ABA filed an action to block the changes to the definitions on the same
day the NCUA published the new rules. 85 Even though the NCUA had yet to
approve any credit union under the new rules, the law allows the banks to bring a

of the Pacific Law Review) (“Rural consists of all territory, population, and housing units located outside [Urban
Areas] and [Urban Clusters].”).
75. See Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,416 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (“[A]t least 50 percent of the proposed Rural District’s population must
reside in geographic units the Census designates as ‘rural,’ or the proposed Rural District’s population density
cannot exceed 100 persons per square mile.”).
76. Id. (defining “Rural District” in section II.B).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (increasing the population limit from 250,000 to 1 million).
80. See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 523–24 (2014) (explaining the
differences between an as-applied challenge and a facial challenge and the heightened standard for the latter).
81. See id. at 524 (citing an earlier case’s rejection of a “facial challenge” as support for rejecting the EPA’s
rule “on its face”).
82. See id. at 523–24 (describing an as-applied challenge as being particularized to a specific application
of the general rule).
83. See id. at 524 (holding that a rule was not invalid “on its face,” even if it might have some uncommon
invalid specific applications).
84. See id. (“The possibility that the rule, in uncommon particular applications, might exceed EPA’s
statutory authority does not warrant judicial condemnation of the rule in its entirety.”).
85. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d 649, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“On the day the NCUA published the rule, the
Association filed this injunctive and declaratory action in the District Court.”).
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facial challenge.86 “Ripeness” is not an issue for a facial challenge. 87
Although the current lawsuit does not attack any specific credit union, it is
reasonable to anticipate that banks are ready to bring new legal challenges as soon
as the NCUA approves credit unions that the old rules prevented. 88 For example,
imagine a credit union the NCUA approves to serve an affluent and profitable
suburb but not the impoverished downtown.89 The D.C. Circuit opinion gives
banks a roadmap for how to bring an as-applied challenge against the approval of
such a credit union.90 The banks could argue that the omission of the urban core is
the equivalent of the discredited practice of redlining, and the D.C. Circuit
indicated that it would view favorably such an argument.91
E. The History of Redlining
It was not so long ago that banks took maps of cities and drew red lines around
minority neighborhoods.92 Their purpose in “redlining” these neighborhoods was
to identify certain areas where banks would not give loans. 93 The excuse was that
these neighborhoods were bad risks for loans, but the real motivation was simply
racism.94
While racial bias in lending is probably as old as lending itself, the modern
version gained a veneer of legitimacy in the 1930s.95 The Home Owners Loan
Corporation (“HOLC”) created a color-coded rating system to indicate the
mortgage-worthiness of neighborhoods.96 HOLC explicitly used racial terms to
describe the lowest rated, red areas as having “little or no value today, having
suffered a tremendous decline in values due to the colored element now controlling
86. Id. at 656 (describing the banks’ lawsuit as a “facial challenge”).
87. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736 n.10 (1997) (describing how a facial
challenge becomes ripe “the moment the challenged regulation or ordinance is passed”); ABA v. NCUA, 934
F.3d 649, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (determining “We see no jurisdictional issues with the rest of the appeal” which
implies ripeness was not a problem).
88. See ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 668–69 (describing circumstances where the court seems to be
favorable towards an as-applied challenge).
89. Id. at 669 (“[C]ommunity credit unions could now serv[e] wealthier suburban counties and exclud[e]
markets containing low-income and minority communities that reside in the core area.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
90. See id. at 670–71 (describing a variety of problems with gerrymandered credit union service areas that
amount to discriminatory redlining and considering the results to be illegal).
91. See id.
92. MANUEL B. AALBERS, PLACE, EXCLUSION, AND MORTGAGE MARKETS 85 (2011) (describing a system
used in the 1930s that color-coded neighborhoods into four levels of creditworthiness of which the lowest category
was red).
93. Id. at 87 (explaining that redlined areas were “identified as areas that should not receive or be
recommended for mortgage loans or insurance”).
94. See id. at 88 (“Redlining [became] heavily associated with racial discrimination.”).
95. Id. at 83–84 (describing how during the 1930s the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations created
national organizations to improve the home mortgage market).
96. Id. at 84–85 (using green, blue, yellow, and red to categorize neighborhoods in descending order of
creditworthiness).
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the district.”97 In 1968, the Fair Housing Act officially ended discrimination in
housing based on race, but community-based organizations and researchers still
found vestiges of explicit redlining well into the 1970s.98 Even today, less obvious
kinds of redlining exist.99
The NCUA’s core-omission rule raises the possibility of something similar to
redlining, and the D.C. Circuit noticed.100 By allowing a credit union to serve only
a portion of a CSA but omit the central urban core, a credit union could choose to
serve affluent suburbs and “redline” around an impoverished urban area. 101
As the D.C. Circuit noted, this is not traditional redlining where an institution
discriminates against customers within the institution’s service area. 102 The NCUA
rules—which prevent redlining neighborhoods within an existing service area 103—
do nothing to prevent a credit union from gerrymandering its service area in the
first place.104 So far as the D.C. Circuit was able to discern on the record before it,
the NCUA had no systems in place to prevent this alternative form of redlining.105
The D.C. Circuit remanded the core-omission rule—without vacating—for the
agency to explain itself better.106
III. FIXING THE POSSIBILITY OF REDLINING
The D.C. Circuit approved most of the NCUA’s rule changes with one
exception.107 The opinion declared the new rule that allows a credit union to serve

97. Id. at 85.
98. AALBERS, supra note 92, at 89 (“Despite these acts and the related move of FHA to the inner city,
research from the mid- and late 1970s clearly shows the existence of redlining, mostly in inner-city areas.”).
99. Aaron Glantz, We Exposed Modern-Day Redlining in 61 Cities. Find Out What’s Happened Since,
REVEAL (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.revealnews.org/blog/we-exposed-modern-day-redlining-in-61-cities-findout-whats-happened-since/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
100. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d 649, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (engaging in an extended consideration of
the possibility for the core-omission rule to permit an unconventional form of redlining).
101. Id. at 669 (“During the notice-and-comment proceedings, the Association warned against redlining
and objected that community credit unions could now serv[e] wealthier suburban counties and exclud[e] markets
containing low-income and minority communities that reside in the core area.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
102. Id. (“Fairly read, the Association’s objection is not to traditional redlining, which encompasses the
refusal to make loans in low-income or minority neighborhoods within a service area.”).
103. Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,414 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (describing the NCUA’s mandate to consider complaints of discrimination
and redlining that come from a credit union’s members).
104. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 670 (“But we do not see how [the NCUA rules fix] gerrymandering or
the potential discriminatory economic impact on urban residents.”).
105. Id. at 671 (“But current reviewing guidelines do not indicate that the agency looks for such
discrimination.”).
106. Id. at 674 (explaining that although the normal remedy is vacatur, the possibility of the NCUA
providing a satisfactory explanation, combined with the substantial likelihood of vacatur producing a disruptive
effect, justified the unusual remedy of remanding the rule without vacating it).
107. Id. at 674–75 (holding summary judgement in favor of the NCUA on all issues aside from the coreomission rule).
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a portion of a CSA without including the urban core to be arbitrary and
capricious.108 The D.C. Circuit determined the NCUA failed to adequately
articulate how it would prevent the possibility of redlining.109 Section A describes
how the NCUA should respond to meet the expectations of the D.C. Circuit’s
opinion.110 Section B warns the NCUA against responses that could lead to future
problems.111
A. How the NCUA Can Get It Right
The D.C. Circuit remanded the core-omission rule to the NCUA without
vacating the rule. 112 This Section presents two ways the NCUA can successfully
respond to the D.C. Circuit’s holding.113 Subsection 1 discusses how the NCUA
can fix the core-omission rule.114 Subsection 2 argues the NCUA can simply retract
the core-omission rule.115
1. Fix the Core-Omission Rule
The NCUA made the case that when a service area must include an urban core,
it can only reach a limited distance into the suburbs, leaving some customers
without coverage.116 The D.C. Circuit found that explanation inadequate in the face
of the much more serious danger of redlining by gerrymandering a credit union’s
service area.117 If the NCUA has a more significant reason why it created the coreomission rule, it should make that reason clear. 118 If the NCUA provides a
sufficiently weighty justification—perhaps involving examples of underserved
suburban populations that cannot be served without omitting the urban core—the

108. Id. at 668 (“[W]e see merit in the Association’s redlining argument and thus hold the definitional
change to be arbitrary and capricious.”).
109. Id. at 664 (“[W]e hold that it is rationally related to the Act’s text and purposes, but that it is
insufficiently explained.”).
110. Infra Section III.A.
111. Infra Section III.B.
112. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 674–75 (“[We] remand, without vacating, the relevant portion of the
2016 rule for further explanation.”).
113. Infra Subsections III.A.1–2.
114. Infra Subsection III.A.1.
115. Infra Subsection III.A.2.
116. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 670 (“[I]t caused community credit unions to sacrifice service to other
areas within the Core Based Statistical Area.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Chartering and Field of
Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,413 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B)
(“[C]ausing an FCU [Federal Credit Union] to sacrifice service to other areas within the chosen portion of a
CBSA.”).
117. See ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 670 (referencing the explanation of serving otherwise unserved
customers, but still concluding that the possibility of redlining invalidated the rule, suggesting that the explanation
was not strong enough).
118. Id. at 674 (“We conclude that the NCUA might be able to offer a satisfactory reason on remand.”).
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D.C. Circuit appears poised to accept the core-omission rule.119
Alternatively, the NCUA could establish a system for evaluating proposed
areas that omit the core from a CSA.120 One possible system would be to evaluate
proposed service areas for discriminatory impact on any adjacent, poorly served
urban core.121 It appears that this would require an expansion of the existing vetting
process for credit union service areas.122 But the NCUA contends that credit unions
already serve most urban cores. 123 If this is true, then it would be rare to have an
adjacent poorly-served area, and the resulting administrative burden would be
slight.124
The NCUA could also change its complaint process to allow grievances from
certain non-members of a credit union.125 The NCUA could allow residents of
areas adjacent to a credit union’s service area to complain that the service area
should include them.126 This would allow residents discriminated against by a
gerrymandering credit union—or more likely their attorneys—to bring the issue to
the attention of the NCUA.127
2. Retract the Core-Omission Rule
Perhaps the simplest solution would be to retract the core-omission rule.128 As
discussed above, with the other changes the NCUA made,129 keeping this part of
the system unchanged is a wise choice. 130
119. Id.
120. Id. at 671 (“But current reviewing guidelines do not indicate that the agency looks for such
discrimination.”).
121. Id. (“the government counsel suggested that the agency may reject proposed local communities if it
suspects they discriminate against residents in the urban core.”).
122. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 671 (quoting oral argument where the NCUA agreed “the agency has no
authority to reject that application, as long as the credit union can demonstrate that they can serve the area”); 12
C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B, ch. 1, § VII.A (2020) (describing the approval process for a credit union charter application
and indicating that the NCUA only considers “adequate service to all segments of the field of membership”
without considering discriminatory effects on adjacent areas).
123. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 671 (“The government counsel also suggested that community credit
unions already cover the vast majority of urban cores.”).
124. Cf. Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979) (reasoning that efforts to combat discrimination
must not create an undue administrative burden).
125. Cf. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 670 (“As the preamble points out, complaints are raised by the
membership, which would not include the affected urban residents.”).
126. Cf. id. (“It seems quite implausible, absent some contrary evidence the agency failed to detail, that
members will file grievances based on gerrymandering harms suffered by residents outside the coverage area.”).
127. Cf. id.
128. See Atl. States Legal Found. v. E.P.A., 325 F.3d 281, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (stating as self-evident
that an agency can respond to the notice-and-comment part of rulemaking by choosing to not implement the new
rule or rule change).
129. See supra Sections II.C.1, 3 (discussing the rule changes that allow a credit union to serve areas that
extend beyond a single CSA and that increase the population cap for rural areas).
130. See Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,412 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (summarizing six significant changes made all at once to a variety of credit
union rules).
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The D.C. Circuit considered the possibility that some customers would benefit
from the core-omission rule.131 But the D.C. Circuit identified no evidence of
actual unserved customers—it was merely a possibility.132 During the comment
process that preceded the NCUA’s adoption of the core-omission rule, no
commenters expressed any such need for service. 133 The relevant comments
merely speculated that requiring a credit union area to include the urban core might
cause the credit union to sacrifice service to another needy area or discourage the
credit union from forming in the first place. 134 If there is no pressing need for this
new core-omission rule, reverting to the previous rule might be an easy way for
the NCUA to comply with the D.C. Circuit’s decision. 135
B. How the NCUA Can Get It Wrong
This Section argues there are two ways the NCUA could fail to respond
adequately to the D.C. Circuit’s opinion.136 Subsection 1 describes the obvious
danger that the explanation the NCUA provides might be inadequate. 137 Subsection
2 explains the less obvious danger that the NCUA could fail to address other
problems the D.C. Circuit highlighted in its opinion.138
1. Provide a Weak Explanation
The D.C. Circuit’s holding directs the NCUA to provide a better explanation
of the core-omission rule. 139 Specifically, the NCUA must explain how it will
prevent the unconventional form of redlining the core-omission rule allows. 140
The commenters’ unsupported speculation that the core-omission rule would
allow credit unions to reach needy customers outside the core did not convince the

131. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 674 (“[W]e perceive a substantial likelihood that vacating the rule could
make it more difficult for some poor and minority suburban residents to receive adequate financial services.”).
132. See generally id. (reaching its conclusion without referring to any evidence of actual customers denied
service).
133. See Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,413 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (summarizing the comments received during the notice-and-comment
process and mentioning no examples of actual needy unserved customers).
134. Id. (describing the comments about the core-omission rule allowing service to needy customers as
speculation).
135. See ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 673 (indicating that the usual practice is to invalidate rules that a
court decides are arbitrary and capricious, which implies that eliminating the rule would also have been a solution
to the issues the court identified).
136. Infra Subsections III.B.1–2.
137. Infra Subsection III.B.1.
138. Infra Subsection III.B.2.
139. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 669 (“[T]he NCUA has not adequately explained [the core-omission
rule].”).
140. Id. (“[T]he response fails to consider an important aspect of the redlining issue or is otherwise so
implausible as to be unreasonable.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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D.C. Circuit.141 Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit discounted the NCUA’s argument
that its annual review and complaint processes would be adequate to combat
redlining.142 The NCUA will need to present something more. 143
If the NCUA provides an explanation that the core-omission rule makes credit
unions stronger by avoiding bad debts, the NCUA would be repeating the historical
justifications given for redlining.144 The D.C. Circuit may look at the statutory
efforts to eliminate redlining as an indication that Congress does not intend to
allow the old explanations to work once more.145 Similar gerrymandering practices
by banks led to enforcement actions by the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau.146 Focusing purely on the rule’s ability to increase credit union
profitability would not adequately address the D.C. Circuit’s concerns. 147
2. Only Fix the Remanded Issue
The D.C. Circuit gave the NCUA a significant “win” and only remanded one
rule change.148 The court did not vacate that change; so, if the NCUA produces an
acceptable justification for the core-omission rule or otherwise adequately
responds to the court’s redlining criticisms, it might appear the NCUA has done
everything it needs to do.149
But that is not what the opinion actually indicates. 150 There are several places
where the D.C. Circuit presents very strong hints that the NCUA needs to address

141. See id. at 670 (referencing the explanation of serving otherwise unserved customers, but still
concluding that the possibility of redlining invalidated the rule, suggesting that the explanation was not
convincing).
142. Id. (“Both aspects of the NCUA’s supervisory process fail to address the redlining issue raised by the
Association.”).
143. Id. at 674–75 (requiring the NCUA to provide “further explanation” beyond what it has already given).
144. AALBERS, supra note 92, at 88 (“Banks may assume that members of certain racial groups are, on
average, less able to fulfill their financial commitments and are therefore more likely to default than are white
applicants with the same observed credit characteristics[.] This assumption may provide lenders with an economic
incentive to discriminate against minority applicants.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–05 (2018) (making it illegal to discriminate in renting, selling, lending, or in any
other way engage in a real estate transaction); Alex Gano, Note, Disparate Impact and Mortgage Lending: A
Beginner’s Guide, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1124–25 n.73 (indicating that 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–05 prevent
redlining).
146. See Gano, supra note 145, at 1138 (describing a case where a bank chose to include six counties and
exclude four counties, thereby excluding most of the area’s minority-majority counties, leading the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau to file a complaint).
147. Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,413 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (including “enhance [the credit union’s] viability” and “additional cost and
resources of serving a core area” among the justifications the D.C. Circuit held were inadequate) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
148. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 674–75 (remanding only the core-omission rule and granting summary
judgement to the NCUA on every other issue).
149. Id. (making the unusual decision to remand without vacating the core-omission rule).
150. See id. at 667–69, 673 (describing several hypotheticals as insufficient to support a facial challenge
but suggesting they might support future as-applied challenges).
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other issues to prevent future as-applied challenges. 151 The NCUA should
capitalize on this rare opportunity to anticipate how courts may rule in future
cases.152 Failure to address these other issues could bring the NCUA back to court
and lead to a less favorable outcome.153
IV. POTENTIAL AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES
In the opinion, the D.C. Circuit reiterated the point that rare hypothetical
problems are insufficient to support a facial challenge such as the one this lawsuit
presents.154 Instead, the D.C. Circuit repeatedly mentioned the possibility of future
as-applied challenges if the NCUA approves certain kinds of credit union service
areas.155 This Part discusses several of those potential as-applied challenges, how
dangerous each one might be for the NCUA, and ways the NCUA might avoid
negative outcomes.156
A credit union that serves non-contiguous areas was unpalatable to the D.C.
Circuit, but Section A discusses how the NCUA might already have positioned
itself to prevent the possibility of non-contiguous areas. 157 Section B examines the
more serious problem of what the D.C. Circuit refers to as a “daisy chain” service
area: a string of areas each connected to the next, but where the ends of the chain
have no significant connections with each other.158 The D.C. Circuit also warned
of purported “rural districts” with mostly urban populations, but Section C explains
this danger may be unrelated to the rule changes this lawsuit attacks. 159 Section D
describes how the biggest potential problem for the NCUA is a credit union that
gerrymanders its service area in a discriminatory, “redlining” fashion.160
A. Non-Contiguous Areas
In challenging the new rule that expanded membership areas to include
multiple CBSAs, the ABA argued the rule would permit a credit union to serve a
collection of disconnected geographical areas. 161 The ABA based the argument on
the absence of the word “contiguous” from the part of the rule that expanded
151. See id.
152. See United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) (“As is well known the
federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions.”).
153. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 668 (“The [ABA] has succeeded in such challenges in the past.”).
154. Id. at 667–69, 673 (describing several hypotheticals as insufficient to support a facial challenge but
suggesting they might support future as-applied challenges).
155. Id.
156. Infra Sections IV.A–D.
157. Infra Section IV.A.
158. Infra Section IV.B.
159. Infra Section IV.C.
160. Infra Section IV.D.
161. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d 649, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“The Association also suggests that the rule
might permit local communities comprising non-contiguous portions of a Combined Statistical Area.”).
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geographical areas out to CSAs.162 The ABA argued the presence of “contiguous”
in the other NCUA rules, and its absence from the Combined Statistical Areas rule,
indicated that the NCUA would approve a credit union membership area with noncontiguous borders.163
The D.C. Circuit did not consider that argument strong enough to support a
facial challenge.164 It looked to the Supreme Court’s repeated holding that the
potential for invalid application does not render a rule itself invalid.165
Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit decided the hypothetical presented by the ABA was
too conjectural in the context of a facial challenge. 166 But the court went further
and hinted that such a proposed credit union—if approved by the NCUA—could
serve as the basis for an as-applied challenge.167
The NCUA argues it would never approve a non-contiguous area. 168 To the
extent the NCUA could alter that policy, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion suggests it
would be unwise to do so.169 The ABA argues the NCUA has already opened the
door for such a change by removing the word “contiguous” from the relevant
rule.170 The NCUA may not have intended to suggest that it might allow noncontiguous areas. 171 The best solution would be to remove all confusion and
explicitly include the word “contiguous” in the rule.172
162. Corrected Principle and Response Brief for Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 39, ABA v. NCUA, 934
F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-5154) (“The Rule provides that a rural district must have contiguous geographic
boundaries, but omits this requirement for Combined Statistical Areas.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id. (“When language is included in one section of a statute or rule, but omitted in another, it is
generally presumed that [the drafter] act[ed] intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
164. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 667 (“[T]he Association would need much more to mount its facial preenforcement challenge in this case.”).
165. Id. at 667–68 (citing EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 524 (2014), Barnhart
v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 20 (2003), Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 619 (1991), and INS v. Nat’l Ctr.
for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. 502 U.S. 183, 188 (1991), all of which conclude that uncommon possibilities for
violative applications do not invalidate a general rule).
166. Id. at 668 (“[T]he Association’s complaint and the District Court’s accompanying worry strike us as
too conjectural.”).
167. Id. at 667–68 (“We might well agree with the District Court that the approval of such a geographical
area would contravene the act. . . . if the agency were to receive and approve such an application, a petitioner can
make an as-applied challenge.”).
168. Corrected Response and Reply Brief for Appellant at § I.A n.6, ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d 649 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (No. 18-5154) (arguing that “. . . the agency’s longstanding policy to limit the community to a single,
geographically well-defined area” prevents the approval of noncontiguous areas).
169. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 667 (including non-contiguous areas in a collection of examples of
unreasonable areas); Corrected Principle and Response Brief for Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 40, ABA v. NCUA,
934 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-5154) (“the agency remains free to change [its policy] at any time without
notice or an opportunity for comment”).
170. Corrected Principle and Response Brief for Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 39, ABA v. NCUA, 934
F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-5154) (describing how the rule changed the word “contiguous” to “individual”
in one place, and in another neither word appears).
171. Organization and Operations of Federal Credit Unions, 71 Fed. Reg. 71,998, 72,012 (Dec. 30, 1998)
(“The entire area must be a single well-defined location. Two, noncontiguous, well-defined areas cannot be the
basis for a community charter.”).
172. See ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 667–68 (including non-contiguous areas in a collection of examples
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B. Daisy-Chains with No Overall Commonality
Under the new NCUA rule allowing credit union service areas that go beyond
a single CBSA, a credit union could propose a service area involving multiple
CBSAs and therefore—according to the ABA—potentially unrelated
communities.173 Of course, it is true the rule requires the proposed area to fall
within a single CSA.174 Because CSAs are created by joining together adjacent
CBSAs linked by commuting patterns, those CBSAs will have “substantial
employment interchange.”175
But since each CSA can consist of several individual CBSAs, some sprawling
CSAs can chain together communities that individually have no ties to each
other.176 CBSAs X and Y can have sufficient ties to each other, and Y can have
sufficient ties to a third CBSA Z.177 Yet X and Z, even if physically adjacent, may
have no direct connections to each other. 178 The new NCUA rule does not require
a credit union to serve the entire CSA, so a credit union could choose to serve an
area consisting of just X and Z.179
This is more than just a hypothetical possibility.180 The ABA identified the
example of the Washington-Baltimore, MD-Arlington, VA CSA.181 Although the
eight constituent CBSAs are each sufficiently connected to at least one other

that the court suggested could serve as the basis for meritorious as-applied challenges); Corrected Principle and
Response Brief for Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 40, ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 185154) (“the agency remains free to change it at any time without notice or an opportunity for comment”).
173. Corrected Principle and Response Brief for Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 36, ABA v. NCUA, 934
F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-5154) (“As the district court noted, a Combined Statistical Area may be a daisy
chain of metropolitan areas that are linked to their neighbors but have nothing to do with those at the other end of
the chain.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,414 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (“The proposed rule added a third ‘presumptive community’: A Combined
Statistical Area as designated by OMB, subject to the same population limit.”).
175. Glossary, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHY PROGRAM, https://www.census.gov/programssurveys/geography/about/glossary.html#par_textimage_7 (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review) (“Combined Statistical Areas (CSAs) consist of two or more adjacent CBSAs that
have substantial employment interchange.”) (emphasis added).
176. See Corrected Principle and Response Brief for Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 37, ABA v. NCUA, 934
F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-5154) (providing data on the Washington–Baltimore–Arlington, DC–MD–
VA–WV–PA Combined Statistical Area, which includes some CBSAs that have no direct commuting ties with
each other).
177. See id. (describing CBSAs that are sufficiently connected, such as the Chambersburg-Waynesboro,
PA CBSA and the Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD-WV CBSA).
178. See id. (describing CBSAs that are in the same CSA but have no commuting ties to each other, such
as the Chambersburg-Waynesboro, PA CBSA and the Cambridge, MD CBSA).
179. See Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,440 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (“The well-defined local community requirement is met if . . . [t]he area is
a designated Combined Statistical Area or a portion thereof.”) (emphasis added).
180. Corrected Principle and Response Brief for Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 37, ABA v. NCUA, 934
F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-5154) (using actual data from the Census to create an example to illustrate the
potential problem).
181. Id.
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CBSA to satisfy the Census Bureau definition of a CSA, some of the individual
constituent CBSAs have no direct commuting ties to each other. 182
The ABA found particularly illustrative the geographically adjacent
Cambridge, MD CBSA and California-Lexington Park, MD CBSA.183 Physically
separated by the Chesapeake Bay, not a single worker commutes from the
Cambridge, MD CBSA to the California-Lexington Park, MD CBSA, yet they are
both in the same CSA.184 A credit union proposing to serve these two communities
would satisfy the new NCUA rule and consist of a compact and contiguous
geographic area.185
While the D.C. Circuit did not address the issue of proximal but unrelated
CBSAs, it did speak to the issue of geographically extensive strips of land that
bring together far-flung unrelated communities. 186 The Court did not issue an
advisory opinion, but it did strongly hint that an as-applied challenge against such
a credit union service area would be successful. 187
The NCUA requires applicants to establish that the area they intend to serve
has the necessary common connection.188 The NCUA should be vigilant in
applying this policy and skeptical of any applicant that offers the sort of “daisychained” service area the D.C. Circuit disfavored. 189 In the past, the NCUA has not
always been as vigilant as it should be and has approved unreasonable service
areas.190 Instead of waiting to be overturned in court, the NCUA can take this
opportunity to prevent a problem before it occurs. 191

182. Id.
183. See id. (choosing these two CBSAs to illustrate the potential problem).
184. Id.
185. See Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,440 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (“The well-defined local community requirement is met if . . . [t]he area is
a designated Combined Statistical Area or a portion thereof . . .”) (emphasis added).
186. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d 649, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (considering an example area that would bring
together Doylesburg, Pa. and Partlow, Va., which are 200 miles apart).
187. Id. (“We might well agree with the District Court that the approval of such a geographical area would
contravene the Act.”).
188. Organization and Operations of Federal Credit Unions, 71 Fed. Reg. 71,998, 72,037 (Dec. 30, 1998)
(“The charter applicant must establish that the area is a well-defined local, community, neighborhood, or rural
district.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
189. See ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 667 (“We might well agree with the District Court that the approval
of such a geographical area would contravene the Act.”).
190. ABA v. NCUA, No. 1:05-CV-2247, 2008 WL 2857678, at *14 (M.D. Pa. July 21, 2008) (holding—
in an earlier case involving the same two parties this Comment discusses—that the NCUA’s decision to approve
a service area that covered six counties, over 3000 square miles, and more than 1.2 million people was arbitrary
and capricious).
191. See ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 668 (“[I]f the agency were to receive and approve such an application,
a petitioner can make an as-applied challenge.”); Organization and Operations of Federal Credit Unions, 71 Fed.
Reg. 71,998, 72,037 (Dec. 30, 1998) (indicating that the NCUA policy requires any proposed “local community”
must show that the residents “have common interests or interact”).
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C. “Rural” Districts with Urban Cores
Another possible future as-applied challenge might involve a “rural district”
service area.192 The ABA objected to the NCUA’s change that increased the
population cap for such districts from 250,000 to 1 million.193 A key part of the
NCUA’s argument involved the possibility for the population of these larger
purported “rural” areas to predominantly live in large cities. 194
The ABA illustrated this possibility with an area stretching from Salt Lake
City, Utah, to Denver, Colorado.195 The overall population of this area is less than
the one million maximum, and the overall population density of the area is below
the 100 person per square mile requirement. 196 Yet 89% of the population of this
“rural” district resides in the two urban cities.197
Although the Court described examples like this—that stretch the definition of
“rural”—as “troubling,” it is difficult to see how this is a problem created by
increasing the population maximum.198 Even with the previous 250,000 population
cap, it was possible to create areas with an overall population density below the
100 person per square mile requirement yet have a large percentage of the
population living in an urban area. 199
In fact, trimming down the ABA’s example to involve just Salt Lake City,
Summit County, and Daggett County produces a population density of less than
100 persons per square mile and a total population of less than the old 250,000
limit.200 More than 80% of the people in that area live in Salt Lake City. 201 If there
is a problem with the NCUA’s definition of “rural,” the problem is not with the
new rule but with the old rule.202
192. See ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 673 (“Again, such implausible outliers do not impugn the rule’s
general reasonableness.”).
193. Id. at 660 (“the new rule increases the population cap for valid rural districts from 250,000 people (or
3 percent of the population of the state where most eligible residents are located) to 1 million people.”).
194. Corrected Principle and Response Brief for Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 55, ABA v. NCUA, 934
F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-5154) (“By greatly expanding the population limit, NCUA has allowed large
cities to be included in rural districts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Id. at 57 (providing a map showing a long, narrow area highlighted over a map of the United States).
196. Id. at 56 (calculating the total population to be 885,216 and the population density to be 72.7 per
square mile).
197. Id. (reporting that Denver has a population of 600,158 and Salt Lake City has a population of 186,440).
198. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 673 (“[T]roubling hypothetical examples of rural districts with unruly
shapes and those with dense urban areas such as Denver, Colorado.”).
199. See Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/ (enter Salt Lake City,
then Summit County, UT, and then Daggett County in the search box) (last visited Jan. 9, 2020) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (combining Salt Lake City, Summit County, and Daggett County).
200. Id. (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (calculating a total population of 243,504,
which when divided by the total area of 2679.8 square miles, gives a population density of about 90.8 per square
mile).
201. Id. (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing the population of Salt Lake
City—200,591—which when divided by the overall total population of 243,504, gives a percentage of about
82.4% of the population living in the urban area).
202. See Corrected Principle and Response Brief for Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 62, ABA v. NCUA, 934
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D. Gerrymandering Around Poor Neighborhoods
The biggest potential problem for the NCUA is redlining. 203 If the NCUA
retains the core-omission rule, a future credit union might propose a service area
based on that rule.204 Such a credit union might deliberately exclude an
impoverished urban core to more profitably serve affluent suburbs. 205 Under the
approval process as the NCUA explained it to the D.C. District Court, the NCUA
cannot reject such a credit union’s proposal.206
This is the circumstance that caused the D.C. Circuit to rule against the NCUA,
even when presented as a mere hypothetical. 207 The D.C. Circuit believed such
gerrymandering around impoverished areas would create a discriminatory impact
on the residents of the neglected urban core. 208 And the potential for such
discriminatory impact generated multiple paragraphs of negative analysis from the
D.C. Circuit.209 If this circumstance were to actually occur, and the banks were to
challenge the resulting application of the NCUA rule, it seems likely that such a
challenge would succeed.210 The NCUA would be wise to speedily implement
whatever policy changes are necessary to prevent the possibility of
gerrymandering-style redlining.211 As discussed above, the simplest solution is to
retract the core-omission rule.212
V. CONCLUSION
Credit unions are an affordable way disadvantaged customers can receive
financial services that might otherwise be unavailable to them.213 But credit unions
F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-5154) (“NCUA’s prior rule, which was never subjected to judicial review, may
itself have been unreasonable”).
203. See generally ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (upholding the majority of the NCUA’s
rule changes with one exception based on the possibility of redlining).
204. See id. at 669–70 (considering ways that service areas might have a discriminatory impact).
205. See Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,413 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (reporting a comment that supported the approval of the core-omission rule
because serving an urban core requires additional cost and resources).
206. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 671 (“[District Court]: . . . If a credit union comes to the agency and says
I want to serve X area, either in a rural district or a combined statistical area, and they meet the definition, the
agency has no authority to reject that application, as long as the credit union can demonstrate that they can serve
the area? [NCUA]: . . . I think that’s probably right, your Honor.”).
207. Id. at 668 (“[W]e see merit in the Association’s redlining argument”).
208. Id. at 670 (“[G]errymandering or the potential discriminatory economic impact on urban residents”).
209. Id. at 669–71 (discussing the possibility of redlining over seven paragraphs).
210. See id. at 669 (describing the possibility of redlining as an important issue and the failure to address
it grounds to declare the rule “arbitrary and capricious”).
211. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 671 (citing a portion of the oral argument before the District Court where
the NCUA stated that it could not deny a credit union’s gerrymandered service area).
212. See supra Section III.A.2 (discussing how the NCUA presented no evidence of actual need for the
core-omission rule and why it might be wise to simply retract the rule change).
213. Baradaran, supra note 29, at 501 (“[B]anks had made their services available mostly to corporations
and wealthy individuals, disregarding lower income individuals.”).
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also compete with American businesses—banks—without having to pay the same
taxes banks have to pay.214 Banks understandably see credit unions as a threat with
an unfair advantage.215 Over time, credit unions have gotten larger and larger. 216 In
2017, the government agency that oversees credit unions, the NCUA, made rule
changes to let credit unions get even larger. 217 The banks fought back and sued.218
In that case—ABA v. NCUA—the D.C. Circuit sent two messages. 219 First, credit
unions can indeed get even larger.220 But second, the D.C. Circuit indicated the
NCUA’s expansion of credit union areas is nearing the edge of what the law will
allow.221
One rule change might have allowed credit unions to engage in an
unconventional version of the discredited practice of “redlining.”222 It was possible
that credit unions—to serve their own financial success—could avoid serving
needy customers by carefully configuring their service area. 223 The D.C. Circuit
held that the NCUA must come up with a better explanation of how it will prevent
this possibility.224 The D.C. Circuit also sent signals that there are other potential
problems lurking in the NCUA’s approval process. 225
ABA v. NCUA packs a lot of guidance into a single case. 226 The course charted
by the D.C. Circuit leads to larger credit unions.227 “Local community” credit

214. BICKLEY, supra note 34, at 3–4 (“Federally chartered credit unions are exempt from all taxes
(including income taxes) imposed by any state, territorial, or local taxing authority, except for local real or
personal property taxes.”).
215. Lalita Clozel, Credit Unions Go on Bank Buying Spree, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sep. 3, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/credit-unions-go-on-bank-buying-spree-11567515601 (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review) (“‘When an entity is in business doing the same thing and gets a free ride, that’s bad
public policy,’ she said. ‘And it’s bad for communities.’”).
216. Reosti, supra note 46 (“Today, credit unions count more than 110 million people as members and
hold deposits totaling $1.1 trillion.”).
217. See ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d 649, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“On December 7, 2016, the NCUA amended
its membership field rules for community credit unions.”).
218. Id. at 660 (“On the day the NCUA published the rule, the Association filed this injunctive and
declaratory action in the District Court.”).
219. Id. at 674–75 (supporting most of the NCUA’s rule changes but remanding as arbitrary and capricious
one rule change that could hypothetically allow a return of redlining).
220. Id. at 674 (holding that allowing service areas that extend beyond a single CBSA and increasing the
population cap for rural districts from 250,000 to one million was reasonable).
221. Id. at 667–68, 673 (describing several hypothetical credit union service areas as problematical and
suggesting that such instances could serve as the basis for as-applied challenges).
222. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 668 (“[W]e see merit in the Association’s redlining argument.”).
223. Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,413 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (reporting a comment that supported the approval of the core-omission rule
because serving an urban core requires additional cost and resources).
224. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 670, 674–75 (concluding that the current NCUA procedures do not
prevent the possibility of redlining and remanding for the agency to provide a better explanation).
225. See generally id. (describing a variety of possible as-applied challenges that could be brought in
certain specific circumstances).
226. See generally id. (containing an in-depth unpacking of the possibility of redlining, support for the
ability of credit unions to compete with banks, and several roadmaps for how to avoid future legal issues).
227. Id. at 656 (“[T]he NCUA has promulgated a final rule that makes it easier for community credit unions
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unions will be able to serve areas that push beyond the boundaries that currently
limit their size.228 The membership of “rural district” credit unions will grow up to
four times as large as they are at present. 229 Banks will face increased competition
from these larger credit unions, and more underserved customers will receive
affordable financial services. 230
But the D.C. Circuit’s opinion also suggests certain things will not happen in
the future.231 Credit unions will not serve disconnected non-contiguous areas or
long “daisy-chain” areas with unrelated ends.232 No credit unions will serve
adjacent but unrelated areas. 233 The NCUA will not approve nominally “rural”
service areas that are in fact predominantly urban.234 And most importantly, one
specific new form of redlining—gerrymandering credit unions around disfavored
areas—is now much less likely.235

to expand their geographical coverage and thus to reach more potential members.”).
228. Id. at 666 (stating that the NCUA’s new CSA rule “allows for larger community credit unions”).
229. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 673 (supporting the NCUA’s increase to the population limit for rural
districts); Chartering and Field of Membership Manual, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,412, 88,416 (Dec. 7, 2016) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 701, app. B) (increasing the rural district population limit from 250,000 to 1 million).
230. ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d at 674 (refusing to vacate the NCUA’s core-omission rule out of concern
for needy customers who would otherwise be unserved); Cassity, supra note 4, at 340 (“Banks began to view
these new credit unions as a competitive threat.”).
231. See generally ABA v. NCUA, 934 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (describing a variety of possible asapplied challenges that could be brought in certain specific circumstances).
232. See id. at 668 (“[I]f the agency were to receive and approve such an application, a petitioner can make
an as-applied challenge.”).
233. See id. at 667 (“We might well agree with the District Court that the approval of such a geographical
area would contravene the Act.”).
234. See id. at 673 (describing as “troubling” certain “hypothetical examples of rural districts with unruly
shapes and those with dense urban areas such as Denver, Colorado”).
235. See id. at 668 (“[W]e see merit in the Association’s redlining argument and thus hold the definitional
change to be arbitrary and capricious.”).
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